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NOTES
Mental Health-Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderma" Back to the Drawing Board for the
Developmentally Disabledt
. Throughout the past decade, the judiciary has been struggling to define
the extent of the legal and constitutional rights of the developmentally dis-
abled. In 1972 a federal court in Wyatt v. StickneyI declared for the first time
that the civilly committed mentally retarded have a constitutional right to ha-
bilitation. In 1975 Congress created a statutory right to habilitation by passing
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act.2 Section
6010 of this Act states that the developmentally disabled have a right to appro-
priate treatment provided in an environment that is the "least restrictive of the
individual's personal liberty."'3 This "Bill of Rights" section was interpreted
by the lower federal courts as providing developmentally disabled individuals
t For a discussion of the constitutional issues raised in the district court opinion,
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977), see Note,
Constitutional Law-Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Ialderman v. Pennturst Closes State
Institution and Mandates Community Care, 57 N.C.L. Rev. 336 (1979).
1. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), afl'd in part, remanded in part, and decision reserved
in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Wyatt involved a class action
brought on behalf of the residents of an Alabama state school for the mentally retarded. Plaintiffs
alleged that the school was being operated in a constitutionally impermissible manner, raising the
issue whether the mentally retarded (now labeled "developmentally disabled") have a right to
adequate habilitation (since mental retardation cannot be cured, the term "habilitation" is more
appropriate than treatment to describe the care of the mentally retarded). The court held that
"[b]ecause the only constitutional justification for civilly committing a mental retardate, therefore,
is habilitation, it follows ineluctably that once committed such a person is possessed of an inviola-
ble constitutional right to habilitation." Id. at 390.
Since 1974 several other courts also have held that there exists a right to habilitation. See,
e.g., Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801 (8th Cir. 1978) (constitutional right to safe and hu-
mane living environment); Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121 (Ist Cir. 1976) (right extended to volun-
tary inmates if they are so helpless that they are confined de facto if not de jure); Eckerhart v.
Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (right to habilitation exists for the criminally danger-
ous as well as for the involuntarily committed); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn.
1974) (right embodied within concept of due process).
The United States Supreme Court so far has refused to rule whether there is a constitutional
right to habilitation. When given the opportunity in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975),
the Court avoided the issue and based its decision on a right to liberty. The Court, however, soon
will have to face the question squarely in Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d'Cir. 1980), cert.
granted, 451 U.S. 982 (1981). The court of appeals dealt only with the constitutional right of the
mentally retarded to habilitation.
2. Pub. L. No. 94-103, 89 Stat. 486 (1975), as amended by Rehabilitation, Comprehensive
Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 3003
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979)) [hereinafter cited as the Develop-
mentally Disabled Act]. The purpose of the federal-state grant program was to help states to
develop new programs in otherwise unaided areas, to achieve more effective program planning, to
help states to use existing funds better and to fill any gaps in current efforts. The program was
meant to supplement funds already available. H.R. Rep. No. 1188, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7355, 7359.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979). Section 6010 provides:
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with a statutory private cause of action.4 In 1981, however, the United States
Supreme Court held in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman5 that
section 6010 did not establish affirmative rights upon which the developmen-
tally disabled could base a private cause of action.
In 1974 Terri Lee Halderman filed suit against Pennhurst, an institution
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of persons with develop-
mental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to appropriate treatment,
services, and habilitation for such disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disa-
bilities should be designed to maximize the developmental potential of the person and
should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty.
(3) The Federal Government and the States both have an obligation to assure that
public funds are not provided to any institutional or other residential program for per-
sons with developmental disabilities that-
(A) does not provide treatment, services, and habilitation which is appropriate to
the needs of such persons; or
(B) does not meet the following minimum standards:
(i) Provision of a nourishing, well-balanced daily diet to the persons with develop-
mental disabilities being served by the program.
(ii) Provision to such persons of appropriate and sufficient medical and dental serv-
ices.
(iii) Prohibition of the use of physical restraint on such persons unless absolutely
necessary and prohibition of the use of such restraint as a punishment or as a substitute
for a habilitation program.
(iv) Prohibition on the excessive use of chemical restraints on such persons and the
use of such restraints as punishment or as a substitute for a habilitation program or in
quantities that interfere with services, treatment, or habilitation for such persons.
(v) Permission for close relatives of such persons to visit them at reasonable hours
without prior notice.
(vi) Compliance with adequate fire and safety standards as may be promulgated by
the Secretary.
(4) All programs for persons with developmental disabilities should meet standards
which are designed to assure the most favorable possible outcome for those served,
and-
(A) in the case of residential programs serving persons in need of comprehensive
health-related, habilitative, or rehabilitative services, which are at least equivalent to
those standards applicable to intermediate care facilities for the mentally retarded
promulgated in regulations of the Secretary. . . as appropriate when taking into account
the size of the institution and the service delivery arrangements of the facilities of the
programs;
(B) in the case of other residential programs for persons with developmental disa-
bilities which assure that care is appropriate to the needs of the persons being served by
such programs, assure that the persons admitted to facilities of such programs are per-
sons whose needs can be met through services provided by such facilities, and assure that
the facilities under such programs provide for the humane care of the residents of the
facilities, are sanitary, and protect their rights; and
(C) in the case of nonresidential programs, which assure the care provided by such
programs is appropriate to the persons served by the programs.
The rights of persons with developmental disabilities described in findings made in this
section are in addition to any constitutional or other rights otherwise afforded to all
persons.
4. Beginning with Naughton v. Bevilacqua, 458 F. Supp. 610 (D.R.I. 1978), afld, 605 F.2d
586 (Ist Cir. 1979), in cases involving inadequate habilitation, courts began to rely heavily on
what they perceived to be a right to treatment guaranteed by section 6010. See also Medley v.
Ginsberg, 492 F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1980); In re Petition of Ackerman, - Ind. App. -, 409
N.E.2d 1211 (1980). Naughton was cited extensively by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979).
5. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
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owned and operated by the State of Pennsylvania for the mentally retarded, in
1974 on behalf of herself and the other residents. Halderman alleged that the
conditions at Pennhurst violated her eighth and fourteenth amendment rights,
that she was being denied her rights under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 19736 and that the institution was violating both the Developmeitally
Disabled Act and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act.7 The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that
unsanitary conditions, assaults on patients by other residents and staff mem-
bers, and instances of self-abuse existed at Pennhurst. 8 The trial court also
found that members of the Pennhurst staff, for their own convenience rather
than for treatment, subjected residents to dangerous physical restraints,
psychotropic drugs and solitary confinement, and that the administration of
the institution, particularly with respect to recordkeeping and evaluations, was
inadequate. 9 The district court held that the developmentally disabled have a
federal constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation in the least re-
strictive environment.' 0 Accordingly, it ordered that Pennhurst be closed and
that all the residents be placed in community living arrangements."I The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit essentially affirmed 12 the district
court's decision, basing its opinion on a finding that section 6010 of the Devel-
opmentally Disabled Act does provide an implied private cause of action.'
3
Upon review, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist,
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979): "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
United States... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be denied the benefits of, or be sub-
jected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance
7. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50, §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1969).
8. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977). The
opinion provides a detailed examination of the institution and its conditions and practices. See id.
at 1302-11.
9. Id. at 1306.
10. Id. at 1319.
11. The Supreme Court noted that, although at the time of the suit Pennsylvania had set up a
Community Living Arrangements (CLAs) Program and intended to transfer Pennhurst residents
to CLAs, the institution still housed 1200 people, 75% of whom were severely retarded. 451 U.S.
at 5.
12. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979). The court
of appeals reversed the district court's order that Pennhurst be closed. Instead it ordered that the
case be remanded for individual determinations by the court or a special master concerning the
appropriateness of institutionalization for each patient (given that the conditions at Pennhurst
would be improved). Id. at 114.
13. Id. at 97-98. The Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1974), listed four factors to
be considered in determining whether individuals have an implied private remedy: (1) Is the
plaintiff one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted (does the statute create a federal
right in favor of the plaintifi)? (2) Is there any showing of legislative intent, whether express or
im.plied, to create or deny a remedy? (3) Is it consistent with the underlying purposes to imply a
private remedy? and (4) Is the cause of action traditionally one of state law for which a federal
cause of action would be inappropriate? Id. at 78. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
found that each of the Cor standards had been met. Plaintifs were developmentally disabled and
thus qualified as the recipients of the right to treatment granted by section 6010. 612 F.2d at 97-
98. The conference report to the Developmentally Disabled Act expressed a desire that the right
be enforced by the courts. Conf. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News 943, 961. The private cause of action clearly would further the purposes
of the Act. Moreover, states traditionally have been responsible for the health of their citizens,
and Congress has not interfered in this instance. 612 F.2d at 97-98.
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held that section 6010 does not create a substantive right to appropriate treat-
ment in the least restrictive environment; thus, there can be no basis for an
implied private cause of action. The Court founded its narrow holding on
three grounds: the contractual nature of a federal-state grant program; the
legislative history of the Developmentally Disabled Act; and the language and
structure of the Act itself.14
First, regarding the contractual nature of the federal-state grant program,
the Supreme Court reasoned that the Developmentally Disabled Act was en-
acted by Congress solely pursuant to its spending power15 and that the Act
itself provides for an ordinary federal-state grant program. According to the
Supreme Court's interpretation, there is no language in the Act referring to the
fourteenth amendment, nor is there any indication in the legislative history
that Congress intended to act under the fourteenth amendment. 16 The Court
concluded that any federal-state funding program enacted under the authority
of Congress' spending power is a contract between the federal government and
a state whereby the state agrees to fulfill certain conditions in exchange for
federal funds. Because of this contractual nature, any conditions must be clear
and unambiguous. Therefore, in the Court's view, if Congress intended to
establish in section 6010 affirmative rights that would be binding on states
taking part in the program, it had to make this intention plain to the states
before they accepted the funds. 17
The second basis for the Supreme Court's holding was the legislative his-
tory of the Developmentally Disabled Act. According to the Court, there was
nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended the Act to
be anything more than a funding statute.18 Justice Rehnquist quoted several
Senators19 and interpreted their remarks as showing that Congress meant
14. 451 U.S. at 18-20.
15. Id. at 17. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had reasoned that Congress acted
under both the spending power and section 5 of the fourteenth amendment when it enacted the
Act. 612 F.2d at 98.
16. The Court noted that it had never developed a test to determine when Congress was
enforcing the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, but since any action pursuant to that
amendment is binding on all states and often involves state concerns, courts should not infer an
intent to enforce the fourteenth amendment without support from the statute and its legislative
history. 451 U.S. at 15-16.
Past cases dealing with the source of Congress' authority did not require such a test because
either the acts themselves or their legislative histories expressly mentioned the fourteenth amend-
ment. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizing
courts to award money damages against state governments for employment discrimination); Ore-
gon v. Mitchell 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (banningvoter literacy tests as racially discriminatory); Kat-
zenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights Act banning literacy tests).
17. 451 U.S. at 17-18.
18. Id. at 22.
19. Among the Senators' remarks were the following: "We have developed a bill whose
thrust, like the 1970 Act, is to assist states in developing a comprehensive plan to bring together
available resources in a coordinated way so developmentally disabled individuals are appropri-
ately served. Our goal is more thorough and careful planning and more effective evaluation." Id.
(quoting 121 Cong. Rec. 16,514 (1975) (statement of Sen. Randolph)) (emphasis added by Court);
"Title 1 of the Conference agreement establishes a clearfederalpolicy that the mentally retarded
have a right to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation." Id. (quoting 121 Cong. Rec.
29,820 (1975) (statement of Sen. Javitts)) (emphasis added by Court).
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merely to establish a federal policy that the developmentally disabled have a
right to appropriate treatment in the least restrictive environment. The Court
emphasized that the Senate's version of the bill,20 containing 400 pages of
standards designed to protect the developmentally disabled's rights, was re-
jected by the Conference Committee in favor of the more general "findings" of
section 6010.21 The Court argued that this action showed that Congress con-
sidered and expressly rejected the possibility of making section 6010 a true bill
of rights that would be binding on the states.22
The third basis for the Court's decision was the language and structure of
the Act itself as an indication of Congress' intent. The Court pointed to the
lack of any clear "conditional language" in section 6010.23 According to the
Court, without such language, states cannot knowingly consent to any condi-
tions imposed by section 6010. Furthermore, the Court noted that the condi-
tions arising in other sections of the Act, namely sections 6011 and 6063,
would be redundant if section 6010 were binding on states.24 Under section
6011, a state may not receive funds without providing assurances that each
state program has in effect an individualized habilitation plan for each devel-
opmentally disabled person in the program.25 Section 6063(b)(5)(C) requires
that each state plan "contain or be supported by assurances satisfactory to the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] that the human rights of all persons
with developmental disabilities. . . who are receiving treatment, services, or
habilitation, under programs assisted under this chapter will be protected con-
sistent with § 6010 of this Title (relating to rights of the developmentally dis-
abled)."'26 If section 6010 were binding on the states, both of these provisions
would be unnecessary. Finally, an interpretation of section 6010 requiring
deinstitutionalization for most developmentally disabled individuals renders
section 6063(b)(4)(A)(ii) meaningless.27 This latter section requires the state to
develop a comprehensive plan to address unmet needs in at least one of four
areas of priority service. 28 Only one of these stipulated areas involves
deinstitutionalization.29
20. See S. Rep. No. 160, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1975).
21. Conf. Rep. No.473,94th Cong., Ist Sess. 41-42, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 919, 960.
22. 451 U.S. at 23.
23. Id. Other sections of the Act contain clear conditional language. Section 6005 requires
affirmative action in employment of handicapped. 42 U.S.C. § 6005 (1976). Section 6011 condi-
tions allotment on assurances that the state has a habilitation plan for each person in its program.
Id. § 6011 (1976 & Supp. m 1979). Section 6012 requires that the state put into effect an advocacy
system for the developmentally disabled. Id. § 6012. Section 6063 covers the state plans, which
must contain objectives for the program, describe services to be provided, set up a plan to address
unmet needs in one of the priority service areas and provide assurances that human rights are
protected. Id. § 6063.
24. 451 U.S. at 25-26.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6011 (1976 & Supp. 1111979).
26. Id. § 6063(b)(5)(C) (Supp. 1II 1979).
27. 451 U.S. at 26-27.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. 1111979).
29. Congress wished states to have flexibility in the spending of federal grants but at the same
time wanted to set particular service goals. It did not intend that a state would remain committed
to only one service area. Instead Congress expected the states to review the priority service areas
1982] 1119
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The Supreme Court's holding in Pennhurst that section 6010 contains
merely precatory language and does not provide affirmative rights for the de-
velopmentally disabled3" was not unexpected in light of a series of prior cases
decided by the Court. In Cannon v. University of Chicago,3 1 in which the
Court held that there was an implied private cause of action under section 901
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197232 prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of sex in educational programs receiving federal aid, Justice
Rehnquist had foreseen cases such as Pennhurst when he stated in his concur-
ring opinion:
Not only is it "far better" for Congress to so specify when it intends
private litigants to have a cause of action, but for this very reason this
Court in the future should be extremely reluctant to imply a cause of
action absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch.33
In Maine v. Thiboutot,34 which held that a section 1983 suit 3s may be
brought based on federal statutory violations, the dissenters had expressed a
strong fear that individuals would bring private suits under statutes such as the
Developmentally Disabled Act.36 In O'Connor v. Donaldson,37 in refusing to
rule on whether the involuntarily committed have a right to treatment, the
Court demonstrated its unwillingness to be "thrust into the middle of sensitive
policy determinations which it is ill-equipped to handle by virtue of its inexpe-
rience in the administration of programs for the mentally retarded. '38
Although the holding in Pennhurst was not surprising in light of Cannon,
Thiboutot and O'Connor, it did require the Court to introduce contract theory
into federal-state funding programs by requiring that all conditions placed by
Congress on the receipt of federal funds be clear and unambiguous. Previously
the Court had held that Congress could fix the terms on which it allocated
money,39 but never had it placed any limitations on this power other than that
the conditions be appropriate and plainly adapted to a permitted end. 40 The
each year and reallocate funds as needed. None of the service areas was ranked higher than the
others. H.R. Rep. No. 1188, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 7312, 7364-65.
30. See 451 U.S. at 31-32.
31. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
32. Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 235 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)).
33. 441 U.S. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
34. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1111979).
36. 448 U.S. at 22-23 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority declared that section 1983 encom-
passes claims based solely on violations of statutory federal law. Id. at 4. The dissent attached, by
way of an appendix, a list of statutes that arguably could give rise to a suit under section 1983. Id.
at 34-37 (Powell J., dissenting). This list included the Developmentally Disabled Act. The dis-
sent urged that this cause of action be limited to equal rights claims. Id. at 12 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). See also text accompanying notes 57-62 infra.
37. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
38. Schoenfeld, A Survey of the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 32 Sw. LJ.
605, 625 (1978).
39. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Oklahoma v.
United States Civil Serv., 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
40. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). The Court, in Lau v.
Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), did foreshadow Pennhurst when it stated that the school district had
[Vol. 601120
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Pennhurst Court cited Employees v. Department ofPublic Health and Welfare4'
and Edelman v. Jordan42 as support for its holding that the conditions im-
posed by the contract be express and clear.43 These cases, however, dealt with
the issue whether a state had knowingly waived its immunity from suit under
the eleventh amendment. 44 Traditionally, when a contract has involved the
waiver of a fundamental right, the courts have required that the waiver be
made expressly and knowingly.45 By its decision in Pennhurst the Court ex-
panded the scope of this requirement beyond the waiver of fundamental rights
to acceptance of conditions to federal funding in general.46
The Court's decision in Pennhurst also required it to apply a very narrow
interpretation to the "least restrictive environment" standard of section
6010(2), 47 which mandates that habilitation for the developmentally disabled
should be provided in a setting that is the least restrictive of an individual's
liberty. The Court accepted without question the interpretation of the federal
district court that "least restrictive environment" is synonymous with deinsti-
tutionalization.4s This interpretation contrasts sharply with that of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which ruled that section 6010 stated a clear
preference for deinstitutionalization but did not prohibit institutions. The
court of appeals' holding would permit the institutionalization of some indi-
viduals if the institutions could provide adequate habilitation and living con-
ditions.49 Such an interpretation would eliminate any conflict between
sections 6010 and 6063(b)(4)(A) 50 and would counter the Supreme Court's
"contractually agreed" to meet the requirements of the Civil Rights Act when accepting funds. Id.
at 568.
41. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
42. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
43. 451 U.S. at 17.
44. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 673-74; Employees v. Department of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. at 285.
45. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (signing a conditional sales contract
does not by itself constitute a waiver of procedural due process rights); D.H. Overmyer Co. v.
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185-87 (1971) (in a transaction between merchants a waiver of constitu-
tional rights had been "voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly" made with "full awareness of
the legal consequences").
46. Pennhurst has been cited for this precise proposition. See University of Tex. v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 399 (1981) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 6010(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
48. See 446 F. Supp. at 1319-20. The district court was not considering section 6010 of the
Developmentally Disabled Act. Rather it was forced to interpret "least restrictive environment"
because of its finding that there is a constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation in the
least restrictive environment.
49. See 612 F.2d at 114-15. See also Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 166-69 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 982 (1981).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 6063(b)(4)(A) (Supp. III 1979):
The plan must-
(i) provide for the examination not less often than once every three years of the
provision, and the need for the provision, in the State of the four different
areas of priority services... ; and
(ii) provide for the development, not later than the second year in which funds are
provided under the plan after ... [November 6, 1978], and the timely review
and revision of a comprehensive statewide plan to plan, financially support,
coordinate, and otherwise better address, on a statewide and comprehensive
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fear that section 6010 imposes too great a financial burden on the states.
The court of appeals' interpretation of "least restrictive" also would re-
solve an ambiguity in the legislative history. The majority opinion of the
Supreme Court pointed to statements by Senators as support for its belief that
Congress intended only to create a federal policy.51 The dissenters, however,
included quotations from some of the same Senators that led them to conclude
that Congress had meant to establish specific rights.52 Under the court of ap-
peals' interpretation, however, these seemingly contradictory congressional
purposes are not actually inconsistent. Congress was distinguishing between a
right to appropriate treatment and a policy of encouraging deinstitutionaliza-
tion. Congress set forth this concept in the conference report's statement of the
purpose of the substituted section 6010:
These rights are generally included in the conference substitute in
recognition by the conferees that the developmentally disabled, par-
ticularly those who have the misfortune to require institutionaliza-
tion, have a right to receive appropriate treatment for the conditions
for which they are institutionalized, and that this right should be pro-
tected and assured by the Congress and the courts. 53
The statement of purpose clearly declares a right to appropriate treatment, but
at the same time it also recognizes institutionalization as an ongoing method of
care. The final sentence seems to suggest that Congress expected this right to
appropriate treatment to be a basis for a private cause of action.
The ultimate effect of the Pennhurst decision is to prohibit the develop-
mentally disabled from bringing a private cause of action under section 6010
of the Developmentally Disabled Act. The developmentally disabled must
look to other theories in seeking redress for improper and inadequate condi-
tions in mental institutions. The Supreme Court remanded Pennhurst54 for
consideration of these theories: suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,56 and violations of the eighth and four-
teenth amendments.
With respect to the first theory-a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
force compliance with sections 6011 and 6063(b)(5)(C) of the Developmentally
Disabled Act-Justice Rehnquist strongly suggested that the Court would not
view favorably such an approach.57 He doubted that there would be a private
basis unmet needs in the State for the provision of at least one of the areas of
priority services, such area or areas to be specified in the plan and (at the
option of the State) for the provision of an additional area of services for the
developmentally disabled, such area also to be specified in the plan.
See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
51. 451 U.S. at 21-22.
52. Id. at 43-44 nn.9-11 (White, J., dissenting).
53. Conf. Rep. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 42, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 943, 961.
54. 451 U.S. at 31.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 111 1979).
56. 29 id. § 794. See note 6 supra.
57. 451 U.S. at 27-30.
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cause of action under Maine v. Thiboutot58 because plaintiffs could claim only
that the state plan did not provide adequate assurances to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and because there might be an exclusive express
remedy under the Act.59 Justice Rehnquist also questioned whether Penn-
sylvania had violated the Act since Pennhurst did not receive federal funds.60
He intimated that there was not an available remedy since the Court would
not force a state to carry such a heavy financial burden. Justice Rehnquist's
comments concerning a section 1983 suit, however, may be viewed as mere
dictum. Thus, it is not certain that a suit under section 1983 would be without
merit. Pennhurst was a six-to-three decision, 61 with Justice Blackmun concur-
ring on the ground that he considered a section 1983 suit appropriate. 62 With
the intervening departure of Justice Stewart, a member of the majority, the
key vote on this issue may belong to the newly appointed Justice, Sandra Day
O'Connor.
The developmentally disabled person who is denied a private cause of
action under section 6010 of the Act may be able to resort to section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.63 The rationale supporting a cause of action
under section 504 is that unnecessary institutionalization represents illegal dis-
crimination.6 To date, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to impose upon
an institution affirmative obligations based on section 504.65 Because of the
Court's emphasis inPennhurst on the expense of deinstitutionalization and the
resultant additional administrative burdens, it is unlikely that the Court read-
ily would allow a developmentally disabled person to recover under section
504. An additional obstacle to the successful use of section 504 is that it ap-
plies only to programs or activities receiving federal assistance. 66 In Pennhurst
the institution itself was not receiving federal funds. Arguably, however, sec-
58. 448 U.S. 1 (1980). See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
59. Justice Rehnquist suggests that this could be the elimination of federal funds. 451 U.S. at
29.
60. Id. at 28. The district court suggested that counties had a financial incentive to send their
retarded to institutions rather than placing them in community living arrangements (CLAs). The
state reimbursed the counties 100% if the individuals were placed in an institution. For CLAs,
which are federally funded, the county had to supply 10% of the funds. 446 F. Supp. at 1312.
61. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Powell, Stewart and Stevens. Justice Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.
Justice White dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
62. 451 U.S. at 33 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
63. See note 6 supra. For cases recognizing a private cause of action under section 504, see
NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863 (2d
Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
64. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1323.
65. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The Court held that
a nursing school did not have to admit a deaf student. Although the Court stated that section 504
was not meant to require affirmative action, it distinguished illegal discrimination. It stressed that,
under the particular facts, the requirement that the applicant meet certain physical standards was
reasonable in light of the financial burden, but the Court expressly left open the possibility that a
situation could arise in which a refusal to modify a program was unreasonable and thus discrimi-
natory. Id. at 411-13.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 111 1979). See note 6 & text accompanying note 60 supra.
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tion 504 would be applicable if it could be shown that the institution was a
part of a federally-supported state program, although not itself receiving fed-
eral moneys.
In addition to relying upon suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a developmentally disabled person could
rely on the constitutional theories developed by courts prior to the Develop-
mentally Disabled Act. In the past, residents of institutions have brought suits
alleging that the conditions of their institutional care violated their eighth
amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.67 The
Supreme Court, however, has stated that "[a]n examination of the history of
the Amendment and the decisions of this Court construing the proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment confirms that it was designed to protect
those convicted of crimes." 68 A more productive approach may be for plaintiff
to assert that she has a right, arising out of the fourteenth amendment, to treat-
ment or habilitation. Lower federal courts have been quite willing to recog-
nize such a right,69 but the Supreme Court thus far has yet to rule on the issue.
This issue, however, is currently before the Court.70
In Pennhurst the Court once again refused to clarify the legal and consti-
tutional rights of the developmentally disabled: "In many ways, this very lim-
ited decision simply muddies the water, providing the states and
developmentally disabled with minimal guidance for making immediate pol-
icy recommendations." 71 While the holding in Pennhurst is narrow and ap-
pears to deny developmentally disabled plaintiffs only one possible theory in
their suits against institutions, that theory-a private cause of action under
section 6010-not only avoided any constitutional issues but also represented
a direct and simple approach. In the absence of a cause of action under sec-
tion 6010, a plaintiff must rely on multiple theories, none of which is very
effective. While lower federal courts, Congress and the Executive Branch have
been moving forward rapidly in establishing and protecting rights for the de-
67. See, e.g., Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502-03 (D. Minn. 1974) (seclusion, physical
restraints, excessive use of tranquilizers, and overall conditions may amount to an eighth amend-
ment violation). But see Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S.
982 (1981) (eighth amendment inappropriate in civil context).
68. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535
n.16 (1979).
69. See note 1 supra.
70. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 451 U.S. 982 (1981).
Romeo, like Pennhurst, is a suit against Pennhurst State School & Hospital. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit described the parameters of the right to treatment. This right arises when a
person is involuntarily committed. Treatment must be provided for patients who need treatment
and are willing to accept it. The right to treatment limits the state's power to impose treatment on
unwilling patients. The form of treatment must be that which is acceptable for the patient given
the current medical or scientific knowledge. 644 F.2d at 165, 169. The Supreme Court's ruling in
Romeo will be very important for the developmentally disabled since section 6010 is no longer a
viable approach.
71. Summary & Analysis, 5 Mental Disability L. Rep. 139, 139 (1981).
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velopmentally disabled, the Supreme Court seems to be both lagging behind
and increasing the confusion. After Pennhurst the developmentally disabled
are back where they were when Wyatt v. Sickney72 was decided in 1972.
MARTHA ANNE GEER
72. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972). See note 1 supra.
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